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HENRY WADE ROGERS
It is with great sorrow that the Journal reports the death of
Judge Henry Wade Rogers on August 16, 1926. Judge Rogers
was the dean of the Yale Law School from 1903 to 1916. His
methods and his personality indelibly stamped themselves upon
[ 112 ]
HeinOnline -- 36 Yale L. J. 112 1926-1927
li t l rin&, t ic r t le J r l " I e.
it t ts r f t lt f t o lo
SCRIPTION :PRI , .GO ,
anadian subscription price Is $5.00 a ear; foreign, ~,2;; a year.
























, . ., li i l e e o
.
, ' ; ia ' , l'er
l i s l i i it . iti t ti l
, i l l t t i i g
ti fli ti
i f t i si il d i si 18).
, ts ,
i l t s f
0), 08), 0). r
y ope1·tll 886) ri ht -






the minds of all the students in the School during that period.
Prior to his appointment by President Wilson as Judge of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 1913, the work of
Judge Rogers had been almost wholly that of an educator. He
had served for long periods as professor and dean of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School and as president of North-
western University. At the Yale Law School he was held in
affectionate esteem not unmixed with awe by all the students.
None can fail to have a most lively remembrance of his vigor
and impressiveness in the classroom. Many, indeed, thought
that he was too exacting in his requirements.
When Judge Rogers was appointed dean, the Yale Law
School and the development of legal education in the countly
had reached such a stage as to call for certain important
changes in law school policy. The reasons for such changes
were given ringing expression in the reports made by him to
the American Bar Association as chairman of its Committee on
Legal Education. Under the existing requirements for admis-
sion, the Yale Law School was growing so rapidly in numbers
that in a very few years it must have rivaled the very largest
of the unwieldy commercial law schools of today. No one at
Yale was desirous of such a development; and, acting in har-
mony with the whole faculty and the corporation, Judge Rogers
very courageously sacrificed the huge expected income from
tuition and adopted the requirement of college work for admis-
sion to the School-first two years and very shortly afterwards
a complete college course. Judge Rogers was never accused of
lack of courage.
The law faculty in 1903 was composed almost wholly of prac-
ticing lawyers and judges. The increasing complexity of our
national life was already calling for greater specialization and
concentration of effort. Law teaching and research had become
an independent profession. During the administration of Dean
Rogers, the character of the faculty was almost wholly changed.
Judge Rogers was not generally believed to be very diplomatic
in his methods; but it can be said of him that in this develop-
ment-one that in many other schools caused such heart-burn-
ing as to burst out into violent conflict-he brought about the
result without any serious amount of resentment.
By the time of Dean Rogers the case method of instruction
had established itself as far superior to methods previously
used. The Dean recognized this fact and he acquiesced and
assisted in the formal recognition of the case system in this
School. This was in spite of the fact that he regretted the
necessity of making the change in his own courses.
In these ways Judge Rogers greatly influenced the history of
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the Yale Law School. Without making a marked impression
himself in the field of legal scholarship, he fostered scholarship
in others and as a teacher and administrator left his impress
upon the lives and characters of all with whom he came in con-
tact. The Law School owes much to the services of Judge
Rogers as dean.
As a member of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Rogers won the esteem of the bar. He was an arduous
worker and his opinions show his fondness for searching and
accumulating the authorities.
THE RENVOI THEORY REJECTED--EXCEPTIONS
The law of every state includes a domestic or internal law
which applies to local situations, and a body of law which is
applicable in situations involving a foreign element. The latter
is commonly referred to as the conflict of laws rule. Where a
foreign state is the place of domicile, or the place where the con-
tract was made, or the situs of the property, the conflict of laws
rule of the forum may require that the "law" of the foreign
state be applied. Does this reference to foreign "law" mean a
reference to the local law of the foreign state, or does it mean a
reference to the conflict of laws rule of that state? If the latter,
then the court of the forum has accepted what is known as the
renvoi doctrine.'
The answer to this problem depends upon the basic theory of
the conflict of laws. According to some authorities each state
possesses exclusive jurisdiction to control the legal consequences
of facts occuring within that state.2 This theory has been in-
appropriately called a theory of vested rights.3 That this is a
misnomer becomes apparent upon a careful analysis of the legal
concept of "right." - No right exists unless a court will recognize
'Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of
"The Law of a Country" (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 509, 511; HiDmmR,
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (1917) Introduction, xxix. When the con-
flict of laws rule of the second country refers back to the law of the forum
it is called remission (Rilckverweisung); but if the reference is to the law
of a third country it is termed transmission (Weiterverweisung).
2 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 20; BEALE, TREATISE ON TI1
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) 100, 104-105. But see Cook, The Logical arl
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 457;
Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (D. N. Y. 1923).
"In the very nature of things courts can enforce no obligations which
are created elsewhere; when dealing with such obligations they merely
recognize them as the original of the copies which they themselves en-
force." Learned Hand, J. in The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93, 96 (S. D.'
N. Y. 1924).
3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 104 et seq.4 For an analysis of this concept cf. FOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
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